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Abstract In this article, using policy documents and both qualitative and quantitative
data sources, we evaluate the extent to which the Belgian welfare system conforms to
trends towards asset-based welfare involving the promotion of home-ownership as an
alternative to social security provision. We conclude that, following the explicit and
ongoing sponsorship of home-ownership since the end of the 19th century, in Belgium, an
asset-based approach to welfare has actually been in place for some time. Most Belgian
elderly people are income-poor (mainly due to low public pensions) but asset-rich. While
the risk of poverty for home-owners in old age is somewhat higher than that for the general
population, it is much higher for elderly renters. As far as the preconditions for a possible
restructuring of the Belgian welfare state in the direction of greater reliance on asset-based
welfare are concerned, we find that most of them are fulfilled. Public debt is high with
increasing costs of population ageing looming large on the economic horizon. However,
although some politicians have raised the issue, so far, virtually no initiatives have been
taken to tap into existing housing wealth. Our qualitative evidence shows that this can be
partly explained by the fact that Belgians have a rather conservative attitude towards the
welfare state, which is expected to provide adequately for ‘traditional’ life-course risks
such as unemployment and old age. Housing is considered a private issue, separated from
the social security sphere.
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1 Introduction
In this article, we evaluate the role and development of so-called ‘asset-based’ approaches
to welfare in Belgian housing and social security policy, within the context of a welfare
state plagued by high public debt and with the retirement of the baby boom generation
looming large on the horizon. Taking cross-national variations in housing regimes as a
starting point, we can actually identify two main ‘strategies’ for governments moving (or
planning to move) in the direction of a higher reliance on asset-based welfare. Firstly, in
those countries where, during the course of the post-war decades, home-ownership has
become the norm, such as Britain and also Belgium, governments under pressure might
look in the direction of elderly home-owners to extract at least some of their housing
wealth in order to supplement income from (public) retirement pensions. Secondly, in a
number of countries where until the 1980s owner-occupation was less widespread, such as
the Netherlands, policy-makers have since been looking to increase home-ownership, as a
means to promote wealth accumulation and better housing quality for the lower income
classes, and to reduce social inequalities. A number of authors (e.g., Gurney 1999; Ronald
2008) have shown how this shift in the direction of more owner-occupation was accom-
panied by an underlying ‘ideology of home-ownership’, resulting in the ‘normalisation’ of
one form of housing consumption at the ‘expense’ of other tenure forms. Furthermore, this
process has also led to a more intimate relationship between housing (policy) and other
parts of the welfare state, in such a way that housing has evolved from a ‘wobbly pillar’ to
a ‘cornerstone’ of modern welfare states (Malpass 2008).
However, as Malpass (2008: 17) has argued, and as has become clear from recent
economic developments, ‘housing is unlikely to become a robust and long-term corner-
stone of a modernised welfare state, for a number of reasons to do with the uneven
distribution of housing wealth, especially in relation to need, and uncertainties concerning
macro-economic performance, consumer behaviour and the capacity of the market to
develop appropriate and attractively priced financial products’. Put differently, and as the
recent turn of economic events has shown, in both types of countries the promotion of
owner-occupation has been accompanied by a shift of risks from the welfare state onto
private households.
In this article, we assess the role and development of housing-related assets in the
Belgian welfare state and the implications thereof for housing policy, welfare state
development and individual economic well-being, with a focus on the elderly population.
In the first section, we provide a brief overview of Belgian housing policy, which has
historically been directed at the promotion of home-ownership. We use large-scale
quantitative evidence from the EU-SILC (Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) to
evaluate whether, as is generally assumed, the elderly have significant financial/housing
wealth which could be called upon, and how this wealth influences their financial situation.
Secondly, we situate the Belgian welfare state within the context of the general debate on
welfare state retrenchment. We take a closer look at the development over time of public
finances, contrasting the ‘poverty’ of the federal government (which is in the current
Belgian constellation still responsible for all matters related to social security) with the
wealth, both financial and in terms of real estate, concentrated in private households. Next,
we assess whether and how this paradox between a poor welfare state and rich households
has been translated into recent policy developments aiming to incorporate housing in the
debate on the financing of the social security system. We conclude our article with some
qualitative evidence on this issue, and more in particular, how home-owners themselves
feel about their position, and how they conceive the role of the state in acquiring a property
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and protecting home-ownership. In the last section, we weigh up the evidence and put
forward some issues for debate and further research.
2 Setting the scene: Belgian housing policy and its outcomes in old age
2.1 State promotion of home-ownership in Belgium
As outlined in the introduction, we start this article with a brief review of Belgian
housing policy. Belgium is, to paraphrase Saunders (1990), a nation of home-owners. But
unlike many countries that recently became nations of home-owners (Doling and Ford
2007; Ronald 2008), Belgium has been one for a long time. The 1889 Housing Law
marked the start of an ongoing promotion of home-ownership and the discouragement of
other forms of tenure (Smets 1977; Goossens 1982; Mougenot 1988; De Decker 2008).
This policy was underpinned by three motives, although their importance varied over the
course of time: (1) promoting family life and more in particular raising children, (2)
disciplining the work force and (3) after the Second World War, supporting the con-
struction industry by stimulating individual households to construct their own new
houses (Goossens 1982).
This pro-ownership policy was supported by both the (conservative) Liberal Party (from
an obvious ideological point of view) and the powerful Catholic/Christian Party (com-
bining the ideological strand with anti-socialism). In the long run, it was only the Socialist
Party that aimed to promote alternative forms of tenure like social rental housing and opted
for more regulation of the private rental market, be it with little success. Social housing
today has a market share that, depending on the region, does not exceed 6–8%, and the
private rental market remains quasi unregulated. Although they defended ‘pro-rental’
housing policies, including an increase of social rental dwellings and a regulation of
private renting, the socialists never contested (the promotion of) home-ownership.
2.2 The financial situation of Belgian elderly: income-poor, asset-rich
We use quantitative data sources to assess whether this policy track has resulted in, as is
generally assumed, the majority of the elderly having significant financial wealth which
could be called upon in times of financial austerity. The idea that housing policies can
reduce poverty in later life by providing a ‘hidden’ source of income resulting from
outright ownership has been addressed by several authors (e.g., Fahey 2003; Ritakallio
2003; Fahey et al. 2004). Inspired by Kemeny (1981), Castles (1998, 13) pointed at the
existence of a possible trade-off between the extent of home-ownership and the generosity
of old-age pensions. As the author puts it:
by the time of retirement, for a large percentage of owners, the process of home
purchase is likely to be complete, leaving them with a net benefit equivalent to the
rent they would otherwise have to pay on the property minus outgoings for main-
tenance and property taxes. In other words, when individuals own their own homes,
they can get by on smaller pensions.
Furthermore, the author found that in countries with high ownership rates, the lower
income groups are more successful in accumulating housing assets.
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In a recent study comparing the situation in Flanders to the other ‘leading’ egalitarian
welfare states in Northern and Western Europe1, Cantillon et al. (2009) found that whilst
the Flemish elderly had the highest income poverty risk of all, they had one of the lowest
scores on a cumulative deprivation index. This paradox was confirmed by Cape´au and
Pacolet (2009), who found that Belgian elderly have a high level of consumption, higher
than can be expected on the basis of their public pension income—with an empirical
replacement rate of 55.7% (Dewilde and Raeymaeckers 2008), from a comparative per-
spective the Belgian pension system is not particularly generous. Belgian elderly are thus
income-poor but asset-rich, as both studies situate the explanation for this paradox in the
level of assets, both financial and in terms of real estate, built up over the life course.
Earlier comparative research (Ritakallio 2003; Dewilde and Raeymaeckers 2008) has
shown that, when taking account of housing costs by deducting expenditure on rent and
mortgages from total disposable household income, in most countries income poverty
figures2 for the elderly are lower than before taking account of housing costs. Based on
data from the 2001 European Community Household Panel for Belgium, the number of
elderly (C65 years of age) ‘at risk of income poverty’ drops from 25.6 to 15.8% (Dewilde
and Raeymaeckers 2008). This result can be linked to the fact that many elderly (74.2%)
are outright home-owners, and thus have no housing costs in terms of rent or mortgage
payments. In Table 1 we present data for 2006 based on the EU Statistics on Income and
Living Conditions (population of 60 years and older3), currently the main source of
information on living conditions in the European Union.
In Table 2 we present a range of financial indicators according to tenure status. As can
be expected, we find that owners have the highest disposable income, while social housing
tenants have the lowest income. The household income of private sector renters is not so
far below that of owner-occupiers, but their housing costs are obviously much higher.
Nevertheless, as housing costs in the SILC data also include insurances, services and
charges, taxes, regular maintenance and repairs and utility costs (water, electricity, gas and
heating), we see that elderly home-owners spend quite a large sum (about € 200 a month,
equivalised) on housing, a sum that is actually larger than their income from other assets
(€ 135). This has as a consequence that, when taking housing costs into account in the
calculation of the income poverty risk, the elderly poverty risk no longer declines for
home-owners: the poverty risk of owners-occupiers now increases from 19.4 to 24.7%. As
the housing stock in Belgium is relatively old, many elderly live in (too) large houses
which are badly equipped and badly isolated (Goossens et al. 2006, Vanneste et al. 2007),
and are consequently faced with large utility bills and maintenance costs. Nevertheless, it is
the group of renters who face the largest poverty risk: taking housing costs into account, for
renters in the private sector the income poverty risk increases from 42.9 to 58.8%, and for
renters in social housing from 33.1 to 64.6%. Put differently, roughly two-thirds (!) of
elderly renters, whether they live in social or private rental housing, are at risk of income
poverty. As is clear from their score on a composite index of life-style deprivation (see
‘‘Appendix’’), this also affects their standard of living (to compare, the deprivation score in
the total population is 0.09). Elderly renters are furthermore almost completely dependent
1 Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, France and Luxembourg.
2 Income poverty is measured by using a relative income poverty line, which is set at 60% of median
population income. To adjust for differences in the size and composition of households, we use the modified
OECD equivalence scale.
3 Only 3.3% of the sample is still working.
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on (public) pension income, as their income derived from assets (income from renting out a
property or land/interests, dividends, profit from capital investments) is negligible.
To summarise, the figures show that in so-called home-ownership countries, being an
outright owner-occupier in old age is perhaps the most important dimension of social
stratification, having a profound influence on economic well-being and living conditions.
Those elderly who did not succeed on the housing market are markedly less well-off in
terms of other indicators, such as disposable income and the composition thereof, and the
extent to which they suffer from life-style deprivation. In the next section, we describe how
the accumulation of wealth in private household’s contrasts with the precarious financial
situation of the Belgian welfare state and to what extent this relates to policy initiatives
promoting a higher reliance on asset-based welfare.
3 Poor state, rich households: fertile ground for asset-based welfare strategies?
3.1 Welfare state retrenchment and population ageing
‘Rolling back’, ‘withdrawal’, ‘retrenchment’, ‘from providing to enabling’: at the end of
the 1980s, these were concepts widely used by scholars and commentators trying to grasp
Table 2 Financial situation of elderly owners and tenants (SILC, Belgium-2006, weighted results)
Owners
(N = 2,158)
Tenants, market rate
(N = 347)
Tenants, reduced rate
(N = 175)
Median monthly disposable household
income (equivalised, €)
1,164 1,026 945
Median monthly total housing costs
(equivalised, €)
200 440 313
Housing costs as % of household income 17.2 42.9 33.1
At risk of income poverty—before housing
costs
19.4 26.9 31.3
At risk of income poverty—after housing
costs
24.7 58.8 64.6
Life-style deprivation index 0.06 0.14 0.15
Average monthly income from assets
(equivalised, €)
135 49 15
Source: own calculations
Table 1 Tenure status of the
elderly (SILC Belgium 2006,
weighted %)
Source: own calculations
Tenure status \75 C75
Owner, outright 74.6 68.3
Owner, with mortgage 6.1 2.4
Tenant, market rate 11.9 15.9
Tenant, reduced rate 6.0 9.4
Free 1.5 4.1
N 1,980 759
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the changes in the development of advanced welfare states. For the first time since the post-
war expansion of the welfare state, governments were looking to cut back rather than
expand. This process was fuelled by a situation of ‘permanent austerity’, partly caused by
‘transnational’ developments such as economic globalisation and the economic and
monetary integration of the European Union (e.g., Duffy 1999; Rhodes and Me´ny 1998;
Scharpf 1998), with the associated stability pact and the acceptance of high levels of
unemployment. It was furthermore intensified by a range of internal pressures caused by
the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial society, such as growing service sector
employment and low economic growth, changing family patterns and population ageing
(Korpi 2003; Pierson 1996).
However, looking back, the general picture is that welfare states are fairly resilient: ‘the
welfare state is here to stay, at least in the mid-term’ (Starke 2006, 206). It was Pierson
(1996) who first pointed out that welfare state retrenchment is a development which is
qualitatively different from welfare state expansion, and should thus be explained in a
different way. According to this author, the welfare state has produced a large number of
interest groups, who can essentially vote against any initiative that is too clearly aimed at
cutting back existing rights. Therefore, governments have developed different strategies—
obfuscation, division and compensation—in order to avoid the blame which results from
unpopular policy decisions. Furthermore, the possibilities for reform seem strongly limited
by the boundaries of existing institutions, policy traditions and conflicts of interest, a
phenomenon which is generally known as ‘path dependency’ (also see Esping-Andersen
1999; van Kersbergen 1999).
More recently, using better data (i.e., based on social rights and benefit generosity rather
than on social expenditure) for a larger number of countries, several studies have found
that the 1980s did in fact ‘mark something of a watershed’, characterised by a relatively
great deal of retrenchment in unemployment and sickness insurance (Allan and Scruggs
2004, 500). For instance, Korpi and Palme (2003) found that in Britain, following the
Conservative government since 1979, by 1995 replacement rates in sickness insurance
were reduced to their 1930 level, while unemployment and work-accident insurance
benefits plunged to half (!) of the 1930 level. In Belgium, unemployment replacement rates
dropped from 74 to 62%. In times of rising numbers of dependants, social expenditure was
kept under control by small, incremental changes such as new forms of selectivity (during
the 1980s) and later by the gradual erosion of welfare transfers (during the 1990s)
(Cantillon et al. 2004, 2007; De Lathouwer 1996).
Although the above-mentioned studies mainly focus on social transfers for the ‘active’
population, most advanced welfare states have also changed their retirement-income sys-
tems during the last 25 years (Whiteford and Whitehouse 2006). However, as many authors
point out (e.g., Green-Pedersen and Haverland 2002), welfare arrangements in policy
sectors such as pensions and health care (in which a large part of the budget is consumed by
the elderly) are very difficult to trim, as they enjoy population-wide support. Furthermore,
especially in countries where pensions are funded on the basis of a pay-as-you-go system,
such as in Belgium, privatisation tendencies are strongly curtailed by the so-called ‘double-
payment’ problem, as the working generation cannot be asked to pay for both current
retirees’ pensions as well their own future benefits. Basically, people expect to receive the
same ‘quality’ of pensions as the ones they are currently paying for. Nevertheless, in most
countries governments have improved the affordability of pension systems by exploiting
their complexity in ‘less-than-transparent ways’—i.e., the obfuscation strategy identified by
Pierson: by changes in the number of years used in benefit calculation; in the valorisation of
past earnings; in indexation mechanisms; in the pension eligibility age… (for an overview,
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see Whiteford and Whitehouse 2006). In Belgium however, changes since 1990 have been
limited to the alignment of the pension age for women with that for men and to the
tightening of contribution conditions for early retirement.
Still, population ageing has fostered ongoing public debate on the affordability of
pension systems and health care. While in 2002 the number of elderly (?60) amounted
to 2.2 million people (in a population of 10.3 million Belgians), this is expected to
increase to 3.3 million by 2030 and 3.6 million by 2050 (Festjens 2005). Although the
increase in life expectancy, which is in combination with the ageing of the post-war
baby-boom generation, the driving force behind this pension ‘bomb’, has for a large part
been an increase in healthy life expectancy (Deboosere et al. 2005), there is no doubt
that population ageing will have a significant impact on both pension and health
expenditure.
Rather than cutting back on welfare, the Belgian government has planned for the
retirement pensions of the baby-boom generation from 2010 to 2030 by financing the
temporary high expenses on pensions through the so-called ‘Silverfund’ (established in
2001), a separate savings fund in which the government deposits any budgetary leeway
at the end of the fiscal year (Festjens 2005). However, as there was a budget deficit in
2007, for the first time since its establishment in 2001, no funds have been transferred
to the Silverfund. In all likelihood, this will also be true for 2008 and 2009 (ZVF
2008).
This ‘collectivist’ reaction to the budgetary implications of population ageing does not
exclude the promotion of individual safeguards. Already in 1987, the federal government
introduced a tax deduction for private pension saving (either at the individual or company
level). And at the regional Flemish level, the government established a compulsory long-
term care insurance in 2001.
Above these practicalities, the ideological dominance of the so-called ‘Washington
consensus’ (Hertz 2001; Klein 2007) has encouraged tendencies towards deregulation,
privatisation and the limitation of public debt for governments suffering from financial
austerity. As a consequence, it is no surprise that governments, when confronted with the
possible future inability of paying for collective services and with the unpopularity of
downsizing them, are increasingly looking for new ways of providing social security (e.g.,
through active labour market policies instead of direct support through benefits) and/or for
additional and/or alternative sources of wealth which can possibly complement traditional
social security arrangements. Given the fact that most welfare states are under financial
pressure and that through the post-war decades households and individuals have increas-
ingly accumulated wealth, it is no wonder that in Western societies the idea of an ‘asset-
based’ and/or ‘property-based’ welfare system has become central to debates on the
restructuring of the welfare state (Regan and Paxton 2001; Sherraden 2003; Malpass 2008).
The underlying argument for an asset-based approach to welfare is to rely more on the
investment of individual households in financial products and property, which over the
long term tend to increase in value over time, and thus can potentially provide a base from
which to procure welfare services from the market.
At the end of September 2008, Belgian public debt amounted to more than € 295.36
billion, equalling 90.9% of the 2007 GNP. At the end of October 2008, debt rose further to
€ 305.95 billion. If we take state assets into account, the net debt is then € 295.07 billion,
which implies that the assets of the state equal € 10.88 billion. As a consequence, the
repayment of this debt consumes 8% of the yearly public expenditure. Compared to its
neighbouring countries (Fig. 1), during the last decades Belgian central government debt
has been significantly higher—it is however, decreasing thanks to the so-called reversed
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‘interest snowball effect’4 caused by an accelerated repayment, which was made possible
by the relatively favourable economic conditions during the 1990s. Given the current
economic climate, the government might however, decide to resort to deficit spending, in
order to prevent a recession.
The ‘poverty’ of the federal government contrasts strongly with the financial wealth5
accumulated in private households (Fig. 2). Mid-2008, Belgian households possessed
€ 864 billion of financial assets, of which € 265 billion in cash and deposits—all this
amounts to approximately € 86,400 per person (Table 3).
On top of these financial assets, Belgian households possess a huge amount of real
estate. In 2001, 70% of households were owner-occupiers (Vanneste et al. 2007). Around 4
million owner-occupied houses and 600,000 second homes represent an estimated value of
approximately € 825 billion. And particularly in Flanders, private households possess
49,118 hectares of building land with an estimated value of € 6.3 billion (all 2006 prices).
3.2 Policy responses with respect to housing
Although there are, given the huge public debt, worries about the future of the welfare state
with its increasing costs, there is in Belgium so far no ongoing public debate on the
(further) ‘incorporation’ of the huge private wealth of households into the social security
system. The most notable change has been that the Flemish socialists have recently become
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Fig. 1 Central government debt as % of GDP (1980–2007). Source: OECD
4 The reversed ‘interest snowball effect’ refers to the fact that by paying off a larger part of public debt,
outgoings for interest repayments could be reduced significantly, so that the available budgetary leeway
could then again be used for debt repayment, and so on.
5 This is wealth without housing wealth.
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the firmest advocates of home-ownership6,7. The (Flemish) Socialist Party today echoes the
Christian Democrats8 (e.g., CD&V 2007) and the former liberal Flemish housing minister
Keulen (2009) and strives for as much home-ownership as possible since ‘this is the best
guarantee for good dwellings and the best manner of pension saving’ (Party manifesto—
www.s-p-a.be; SP.a 2008). It was the former socialist party chairman Stevaert (2003a, b,
2004, 2005) who persuaded the party to start promoting home-ownership, and who was the
first to make the link between housing policy and social security.
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Fig. 2 Net financial wealth in million € (1992–2007). Source: National bank of Belgium
Table 3 Belgium, households’
financial assets, mid-2008
Source: BelgoStat
Amount in
million €
% of total
Cash and deposits 264,653 30.6
Effects with fixed interest 70,604 8.2
Shares and other participations 205,687 23.8
Participation in collective investments 106,749 12.4
Insurance-like services 207,738 24.1
Other 8,615 1.0
Total 863,706 100
6 See Elsinga (1995) for a similar development in the Netherlands.
7 Today, only the (small) Green party is a firm advocate of renting.
8 See Smets (1977), Goossens (1982), Mougenot (1988), Van Herck and Avermaete (2007) and De Caigny
(2007) on the ‘devotion’ of the Catholic/Christian party to home-ownership.
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Most Flemish dream of owning their house…An owned house is not a luxury that is
only for the rich, it is for everybody. An owned house is after all a form of social
security. It is a money-box for the future and offers protection and security, warmth
and cosiness. As a consequence, renewing housing policy goes beyond social
housing. Of course, we need enough modern and well-equipped social dwellings, and
of course the tenant needs to be protected. But those who buy a house ‘rent’, so to
speak, for a period of twenty years. They pay rent to the bank. (…) But ‘‘renters from
the bank’’ have one benefit: in the end, they own the house (Stevaert 2003a).
If you repay a loan, you live for free. If you keep on renting, you never live for free.
So, the idea is that ordinary people can buy a house and they can borrow at normal
interest rates. (…) My ideal is of a society with as many owners as possible and as
few tenants as possible. As a socialist, I am convinced that such a system makes
people feel responsible. (…) I want more money for social housing, but less people
living in social housing (Stevaert 2003b, translation by the authors).
Despite these bold statements, specific policies so far rarely link home-ownership to
issues concerning social security in an explicit way. Housing policies are still predomi-
nantly aimed at increasing owner-occupation through a range of subsidy schemes and at
keeping low-income owners in the system. The latter occurs through an insurance9 which
covers part of the mortgage in case of unemployment. Furthermore, ‘conservative’ mort-
gage legislation—that also forbids reversed mortgages and limits interest increases/
decreases in the case of variable interest rates—prohibits the introduction of ‘exotic’
mortgage products, with the consequence that there is much less speculation on house
prices in Belgium compared to some other European countries and that mortgages are not
used to back up consumption like elsewhere (see e.g., Elsinga et al. 2007).
This prudent attitude does not imply an unawareness on the part of the different gov-
ernmental levels (of which the federal and regional levels are the most important) of the
huge wealth stocked in housing. For instance, former Flemish and current federal Prime
Minister Yves Leterme, a Christian-democrat with ties to the Christian trade union, raised
the issue when stating that the paradox ‘poor government—rich citizen’ cannot last forever
and that households will one day have to take responsibility for themselves (Leterme
2009). However, when policy-makers have sought to stimulate the use of this wealth, this
has been limited to encouraging home-ownership among the children of home-owners.
Some years ago, the federal government drastically lowered taxes on the donation to
descendants of dwellings or plots of land for housing construction. More recently, the
Flemish government agreed to introduce a so-called ‘mom-and-dad’ loan, allowing the
donors an extra tax exemption for financing the purchase and renovation of a house by
children or other relatives. It has to be stressed that this is basically nothing more than
rewarding a practice that has been firmly in place for a long time (see for instance, Doms
et al. 2001; Gedas et al. 2001; De Decker 2005). The achievement of owner-occupation by
younger generations is partly financed by older generations, with around 18.2% of new
9 This insurance, which, since the Flemish government paid the premium, was free for eligible low-income
owners, was after a bidding process awarded to a private insurance company (Ethias) for a period that
expired in 2008. A new bid was opened. Only the same company applied, but at far higher rates. At first, the
government intended to stop the scheme, but after some political commotion in Parliament, a new bidding
process was opened. In the hope that more candidate insurers will apply, the target group has been enlarged
to all income groups.
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‘projects’ (purchase or construction) involving gifts or loans from family (mainly partial
finance; Heylen et al. 2007).
To summarise, in this section we have established that poor governments/political
parties are indeed thinking of home-ownership as a form of financial security which could
be called upon in old age. However, so far there is no evidence that policy-makers are
actively seeking to free the capital stocked in housing. Policy changes in the domain of
housing have been mainly limited to making it easier—at least in theory—for the younger
generations to purchase their own house. In part, this lack of policy developments towards
more asset-based welfare might be linked to the fact that there is no societal consensus on
this issue, and that any movement in this direction might be punished by voters.
4 Housing as a source of social security? Qualitative evidence from the OSIS
research project
‘For me, my home is first of all a place of rest. A place where you can hide after
work. It is like ‘‘coming home’’. A place where you are at ease. A safe place. A place
to retreat with the people you like’ (home-owner, woman, 50 years).
‘We are not investors’ (home-owner, woman, 37 years).
The main conclusion from our analysis so far is that, although there was and is no public or
political debate on the issue, the asset-based welfare state in Belgium has been firmly in
place for decades. Given the low level of public pensions, Belgian elderly provide for old
age by accumulating assets, in the form of both owner-occupation and financial wealth.
Due to the continuous promotion of home-ownership, housing thus represents a large share
of households’ assets. But what do people think about the (possible) relationship between
their housing wealth and issues of social security? Do they follow the reasoning that, given
their wealth, they should pay more for things like health and elderly care or provide for
their own (additional) pension?
To explore public attitudes on the potential of use of housing wealth in order to
complement more traditional forms of social security, we use data from the OSIS Research
Project10 (Origins of Security and Insecurity). This internationally comparative research
project had two main objectives. The first was to analyse the factors that have impacted
upon individual households and have consequences for their position as home-owners. The
second was to establish: (a) how households perceive patterns of security and insecurity,
advantage and disadvantage associated with different housing positions; (b) how these
perceptions have moulded their personal strategies with respect to housing and jobs, family
size, education and pensions; and (a) how these housing positions have provided them with
material security or insecurity.
These research questions were framed by two international trends. The first is the
ongoing increase of home-ownership rates in Europe, making it a continent of home-
owners (Doling and Ford 2007). This increase is as much linked to increasing economic
affluence as it is to government policies such as the sale of social rental housing (see Jones
and Murie 2006) or the introduction of tax incentives (e.g., the Netherlands—see Elsinga
1995). The second is that in some countries (e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom,
Finland), house prices have been volatile, manifesting booms and busts, with the conse-
quence that owners were caught (at least temporarily) with negative equity or even
10 See http://www.osis.bham.ac.uk/reports.htm.
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experienced repossession of their home (Ford et al. 2001). Since house prices are linked to
the economy, volatility is a basic feature, which raises the question of whether collective
provisions like social security can or should be (partly) linked to something that is
intrinsically unstable.
Given the fact that, in the long run, housing wealth tends to increase, given the forced
austerity of the Belgian welfare state and given that ownership is increasingly associated with
issues of social security (see Stevaert earlier), using a qualitative research design we probed
our respondents on their feelings towards home-ownership, their strategies to secure home-
ownership and their attitudes towards using the assets of their home for social security.
It is important to stress that the Belgian OSIS sample was dominated by urban residents.
‘Urban’ not only by location but also by attitude, since the large majority of respondents
enjoy city life and, for the majority, moving to the countryside or to the suburbs is not a
consideration. Thirty in-depth interviews with 20 owners and 10 tenants of an ‘active’ age
were carried out in Ghent in June and July 2005. Of our 30 respondents, 27 lived in inner-
city neighbourhoods, two in the suburbs and one further out. Six respondents had lost their
home before and seven could be considered ‘poor’ owners. Only two respondents lived in
detached houses and only one in a semi-detached house. All the others lived in either a
terraced house or a flat. With respect to the interpretation of our findings, it is important to
emphasise that this sample is atypical, as Belgian housing policy has a strong anti-urban
bias and has channelled people towards buying detached and semi-detached houses in non-
urban areas (Mougenot 1988; De Decker et al. 2005; De Decker 2008). A second cau-
tionary note should also be made as, although this kind of qualitative research does not
seek to be representative, in our sample, highly educated respondents are overrepresented.
The main research instrument was a topic guide which structured the in-depth inter-
views. This guide was designed to cover issues relevant to households’ appraisal of their
housing security and insecurity. In each country, the same topic guide and analytical
coding framework was used to structure the research and analysis (Toussaint et al. 2007).
The OSIS research findings shed considerable light on the conclusions reached in the
previous sections. Several issues were highlighted concerning home-ownership among
individually and publicly funded means of social security. Also significant were the
opinions of respondents on the quality of the Belgian social security system, including their
attitudes towards using housing wealth to supplement pension incomes. Before reporting
our results concerning these two issues, we have to stress that nearly all respondents used a
diverse range of strategies to become an owner-occupier in an affordable way in the first
place (De Decker 2007).
4.1 Private safety nets are important
Although rational calculation and confidence in future earnings are prominent in becoming
a home-owner (De Decker 2007), we also observed some ambiguity—or even anxiety—
since most of our respondents used a wide array of private safety nets. Some even com-
bined a range of more or less private, additional arrangements (see Table 4): different
private insurances, building up savings, calculations of the increased value of the dwelling
in case of a forced sale, social security benefits and other state aid (e.g., insurance against
income loss—see earlier), private pension funds, insurances against illness and hospitali-
sation, and finally, help from family and friends11. What was important here was that the
11 Fifteen of the 20 respondents who own a house had a private health insurance; 11 had a private pension
saving plan.
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higher the professional status, household earnings and household stability, the more safety
measures these households considered or had—this was particularly true for hospital
insurance, which is typically seen as a luxury12. This means that the wealthier people are,
the more they are protected, and the poorer they are, the less they are protected. The latter
group mainly consists of lone mothers with children, which brings relational instability to
the forefront as a major source of housing and financial insecurity (also see De Decker and
Geurts 2003).
Private safety nets are not only of a monetary nature, as they also include the possibility
of financial support from family and, to some extent, friends. Although all respondents
stressed that they would only call on family and friends when all other roads are closed, a
large majority did consider it a viable option. Note that this is not a virtual safety net but a
real one, already used by different respondents. For example, following a divorce, one of
our respondents stayed in the marital home. During the period between breaking up with
his first wife and meeting his second partner, he faced hardship, including a threat of being
placed on the ‘black list’13. During the hardest times, he received a lump-sum from his
Table 4 Ghent sample, resources of home-owners
Type Amount
R1 Savings & investments ± € 50,000
R2 Savings & real estate (more than 1) Does not want to answer
R4 Savings & real estate (more than 1) Difficult to estimate since some are co-owner—
it concerns a lot of money
R5 Savings & shares Pretends she does not know (‘‘enough’’)
R7 Savings Little
R8 Savings & coupons (inherited) ± € 20,000
R15 Savings & shares ± € 75,000
R16 Savings ± € 30,000
R17 Savings ± € 2,500
R18 Savings ± € 5,000
R20 Savings € 25,000 to 50,000
R22 Savings, shares in the company where she works,
shares & funds, real estate (2)
± € 625,000 without real estate
R23 Savings Pretends he does not know
R24 Nothing 0
R25 Savings ± € 25,000
R26 Savings ± € 5,000
R27 Savings Fluctuates but is never less than € 20,000
R28 Savings ± € 6,000
R29 Nothing 0
R30 Nothing 0
12 Note that there is an ongoing silent increase of the share that people have to provide for themselves
(Avalosse et al. 2006).
13 When mortgage instalment payments are delayed for more than three months or when the instalment is
not paid within a month after a default notice, this is reported to a central government agency. The so-called
‘black list’ is accessible to credit institutions when evaluating new loan applications. This government
organisation was founded to avoid the accumulation of different loans with different financial institutions.
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parents to see him through. Another self-declared ‘poor’ homeowner, who had faced a
divorce, unemployment and a house fire, was helped out on different occasions by friends.
She got informal loans that she could repay without interest, at a suitable time. A further
example was provided by a 32-year-old woman with two young children who faced
difficulties in paying the mortgage when her husband moved out. She received some
financial support by her brother, whom she had to repay, and from her mother, who was
caring for her children when she was at work. A final example was a disabled person facing
divorce. She was also pretty sure that she could count on her parents to help out in case of
financial problems.
4.2 Is social security securing?
From the previous sections, we have learned that two major strategies overlap. On the one
hand, there is the ‘risk-avoidance strategy’ when entering home-ownership, and on the
other hand, we have seen that an overwhelming majority of respondents use a wide
spectrum of private safety net arrangements (although most of these are not directly linked
to home-ownership). This shows confidence and prudence at the same time. If we probe
deeper into the attitudes and strategies of households with respect to risk, different factors
come to the forefront. The first is that most respondents still strongly believed in the social
security system. This was often because they had already enjoyed the benefits: some
respondents had already benefited from unemployment transfers, disability/illness pay-
ments or an adaptation of the interest rate of a social loan following an income drop. This
belief in the social security system becomes even clearer when analysing the response to
questions on a possible introduction of reversed mortgages14 as a supplement to (public)
pension income. Most respondents not only considered it a bad idea to use housing wealth
to complement their pensions, but also expressed the hope that the social security system
would never reach a state when this would be necessary. A majority of respondents agreed
that the Belgian social security system offers adequate protection against major set-backs
like unemployment and illness, and provides sufficiently high pensions (although most are
saving for old age). And if not, they believed that the state should offer decent protection.
The following quotations illustrate respondents’ aversions concerning reversed mortgages
and their opinions on the role of the social security system.
‘they [the banks] are a gang of thieves. I think that what is left should go to the
children. (…) It is a scheme for couples without children’ (homeowner, woman,
63 years).
‘Basically you give your house to the bank. It is beneficial to the bank. I’ll try to save
myself for my pension. It is not a good system’ (tenant, woman, 24 years).
‘It is not a good scheme if you have children. Above that, it is a dangerous scheme
since you become dependent on a bank’ (homeowner, man, 38 years).
‘The banks profit from the fact that pensions are low. I hope that it will not happen
over here. I count on our social security system. We pay for it… and what’s more, I
do not want the power over my pension to go to the bank’ (tenant, woman, 26 years).
14 The banking sector is lobbying to make reversed mortgages legal and at different occasions bills have
been announced, but so far with little political or electoral success.
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‘I do not think it exists over here. But I think it will come. If you listen to the
statements of the likes of Vande Lanotte15 on ownership and you look at the pensions.
I interpret this as a clear hint that there is not enough money for paying our
pensions. (…) It is not a good system. The owner-occupied house is the classic
method for the worker to acquire some property. They have no access to other forms
of capital formation. They don’t do that. It is not fair. If they need money, they should
look at other forms of capital formation’ (homeowner, man, 29 years).
The importance attached to the social security system becomes even more obvious when
people were asked whether the state has any responsibility for helping people secure
owner-occupation. However, answers indicated that people distinguish between housing
issues (including home-ownership) and social security (a system that protects against set-
backs like unemployment, illness and old age). So, when asked whether the state has any
role or responsibility if an owner fails to pay for his/her mortgage loan, most respondents
were very cautious. To a large extent, they felt that owners are responsible for their own
decisions. For some, it was a matter of principle that the state should not help owners (one
37-year-old civil servant had, as he put it, ‘a Thatcherite view on it’). The general line of
reasoning was that if you decide to become a home-owner you are aware of the conse-
quences. And ‘if something goes wrong, you should limit your dinner to some slices of
bread with jam for a while’.
Respondents saw no need for safeguarding mortgage repayments of ‘would-be owners’
since there exists an elaborate social security system. According to a 39-year-old man who
owned a large house where he lived with his wife and two children, Belgium has a ‘pretty
good social security system’ and that should be sufficient. One respondent feared misuse
and suggested that no more than minimal support should be provided: ‘a temporary roof,
not more’. For a 35-year-old woman the situation was such that, ‘in our country, when you
lose your income, there is always something. You will not end up on the streets’.
In elaborating on this question, only one respondent, a single mother now working for
the housing administration of the city of Ghent, linked her opinion to housing policy more
generally. Since the government has stimulated and keeps stimulating ownership,
according to her, the government has to be consistent and provide a safety net. This implies
that she is in favour of the already existing free insurance against income loss for low-
income households (see De Decker 2005). According to her, however, it should be more
general and generous.
5 Conclusion and discussion
In this article, based upon the consideration of policy documents and both qualitative and
quantitative data sources, we have provided a sketch of Belgian housing asset and welfare
systems and assessed the extent to which the state has joined the trend towards the pro-
motion of home-ownership as an alternative form of social security provision.
Although it is often assumed that in countries with high home-ownership rates, pensions
can be less generous because of low housing costs in old age (Castles 1998; Kemeny
1981), our quantitative evidence shows that, at least for Belgium, this claim might turn out
not to be completely true. As opposed to earlier research on this topic, our quantitative
information includes all housing costs (not just rent or mortgage payments). Using this
15 Former chairman of the Flemish Socialist Party and former Federal Minister of the Treasury.
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information to recalculate income poverty risks, we actually found that the poverty risk
increases for all tenures, although much more for both private and social renters. In fact,
the housing costs of elderly home-owners turn out to exceed their income from other
assets. This somewhat puzzling finding can be linked to the fact that the Belgian housing
stock is rather old, with many elderly households concentrated in badly-equipped and
badly-isolated houses, which are often too large for their needs. We could thus say that for
these elderly, freeing up housing wealth by, for instance, moving to a smaller, more
modern house, could have a positive impact on both the quality of housing and housing
costs. From a policy perspective, this avenue might be worth looking at. On the other hand,
based on the fact that compared to elderly home-owners, elderly renters face extremely
high poverty risks, we could say that in Belgium, an asset-based approach to welfare has
actually been in place for decades. While the elderly poverty risk for home-owners is
somewhat higher than that for the general population, it is particularly high for elderly
renters. As this group receives virtually no help with their housing costs in Belgium,
economic well-being in old age is already to a fairly large extent based on assets. Or, as
found in our study, Belgian elderly are income-poor but asset-rich.
As far as the preconditions for a possible restructuring of the Belgian welfare state in the
direction of more reliance on asset-based welfare are concerned, we can conclude that most
of them are fulfilled. Although decreasing during the last 15 years, from a comparative
perspective public debt is high. Furthermore, the costs of population ageing (both in terms
of pensions and in terms of health care) are looming large on the horizon, while the so-
called Silverfund—which was supposed to bridge the most difficult years through very
high social spending—is threatening to turn into an empty box. On the other hand, both
financial and housing wealth accumulated in private households has been increasing for
decades, and currently about three-quarters of the elderly are outright home-owners.
Nevertheless, recently the only major political party defending the interests of (social)
renters has also turned to the promotion of home-ownership as the ‘ideal’ tenure. Belgium
is in many ways an extremely conservative country. While some housing policies have
made it easier to pass on housing wealth to the future generations (again promoting home-
ownership), virtually no initiatives have been taken to convert housing into other forms of
wealth, neither for the younger generations (as there are for instance no ways to convert
housing wealth into consumption through re-mortgaging), nor for older generations (no
equity release schemes). This lack of policy interest in the possibilities of using the housing
wealth concentrated in private households is also reflected in the views of the respondents
in our qualitative research. Most of them use a whole range of risk-avoiding strategies
when they enter home-ownership: by making sure they can afford repayments and by
protecting themselves through a range of (private) insurances. Furthermore, they see no
role for the state when owners do not manage to pay their mortgage, and they are extremely
resistant to the suggestion of using housing wealth in order to supplement (public) pension
income. To summarise, we can say that in Belgium, housing is considered as a private
issue, separated from the social security sphere. Hence, it seems that there exists a real
trade-off between housing and pensions, as the class of owners-occupiers in Belgium is
very reluctant to trade housing wealth for a higher pension.
This brings us to our last point of discussion, which might be circumscribed as ‘home-
ownership, limits to growth?’ During the last decades, home-ownership has increased from
65.4% in 1991 to 69.5% in 2001, but this has only been possible through the combined
effects of low interest rates, the increase in dual-earner households and because of inter-
generational transfers which have made it possible to keep up with rising house prices.
There are however, a number of trends which might limit a further increase in
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home-ownership, such as the increase in single-person and single-parent households (for
instance because of rising divorce rates), and increasing job insecurity. At the same time,
older generations are living longer and might have to consume more of their wealth in
order to sustain their living standards or to pay for their health care needs. Thus, there is a
distinct possibility that those people who do not manage to achieve owner-occupation—
which currently amounts to about one-quarter of the population—will no longer diminish,
while their financial position might actually be worse than in the past. For these people,
there are no assets to base any welfare on.
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Appendix
Our life-style deprivation index is based on 18 so-called non-monetary indicators referring
to financial stress and life-style deprivation arising from a lack of economic resources
(Dewilde and Vranken 2005; Whelan et al. 2001). Items are coded as 1 (deprived) or 0 (not
deprived); the deprivation score is calculated as the weighed sum of all items, with the
weights corresponding to the proportion of non-deprived. This way, situations of
Table 5 Non-monetary indicators of poverty/deprivation (SILC Belgium 2006)
The dwelling has the following problems: leaky roof, damp ceilings, walls, floors or foundations, rot in
window frames and doors
The household cannot afford keeping the house adequately warm
The dwelling has no separate bathroom
The dwelling has no indoor toilet for private use
The household has been unable to pay for rent or mortgage loans during the past 12 months
The household has been unable to pay for utility bills during the past twelve months
The household has been unable to pay for hire purchases or other loans (excl. housing) during the past
12 months
The household cannot afford a week’s annual holiday
The household cannot afford eating meat, chicken or fish every second day, if wanted
The household is not able to finance (with own resources) unexpected expenses
The household cannot afford a (mobile) phone
The household cannot afford a colour television
The household cannot afford a computer
The household cannot afford a washing machine
The household cannot afford a car
The household finds it difficult or very difficult to make ends meet
Total housing costs are somewhat of a burden, or a heavy burden
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deprivation which are less common in the population, and thus lead to stronger feelings of
relative deprivation, are weighted more heavily. We divide the total sum by the sum of the
weights, so that our index ranges from 0 (no deprivation) to 1 (completely deprived).
Cronbach’s Alpha (a measure of ‘internal consistency’) for this index is 0.76 (see Table 5).
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